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A trademark is a species of property that denotes a particular standard of quality embedded
in a product or service, symbolizes the goodwill of its owner, and represents an advertising
investment.1 Trademarks have been around for 150 years. 2 In that time, changes have been made
to the controlling federal statute, the Lanham Act. 3 Two major changes to the Lanham Act
occurred in the form of two recent Supreme Court Cases: Matal v. Tam and Iancu v. Brunetti.4 In
the aftermath of those cases, some scholars have raised additional questions about whether the
dilution by tarnishment provision in the Lanham Act is unconstitutional.5 These scholars argue
that the dilution by tarnishment provision constitutes viewpoint discrimination.
This note will analyze the constitutionality of the dilution by tarnishment provision after
the holding of these two landmark Supreme Court Cases. Part II of this note will set out the general
legislative and social history of trademark law. It will explore how trademark law has changed
over time, how the dilution by tarnishment provision has evolved, and how freedom of speech and
the concept of viewpoint neutrality have influenced recent trademark decisions.6

1 1 Gilson on Trademarks § 1.03 (2020).
2

1 Gilson on Trademarks § 1.01 (2020) (noting that under the Federal Trade Mark Act of 1870, 121 trademarks
were registered in the year 1870).
3 See Generally Kenneth L. Port, The Expansion Trajectory: Trademark Jurisprudence in the Modern Age, 92 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 474, 478-81 (2010).
4 See generally Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019); Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
5 See Generally, Ryder Hogan, Examining the Unconstitutionality of Dilution By Tarnishment After Tam, 27 AM.
U.J. Gender SOC. POL’Y & L. 465 (2019); Lisa Ramsey, Symposium: Increasing First Amendment Scrutiny of
Trademark Law After Matal v. Tam, SCOTUSblog (June 20, 2017, 2:33 PM)
https://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/symposium -increasing-first-amendment-scrutiny-trademark-law-matal-v-tam/.
6 See Generally Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination Revisited, 98 VA. L. R EV. 231, 235 (2012).
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Part III of this note will argue that the dilution by tarnishment provision is constitutional
because it is not as broad as other struck down provisions of the Lanham Act that have been struck
down and is not aimed at viewpoints, but instead reflects the underlying goal of trademarks.
Finally, Part IV will consider solutions for trademark law if courts reject the arguments in this
comment. Arguments about the dilution by blurring statute are beyond the scope of this article. 7
PART II
TRADEMARK LAW
Congress enacted the first federal trademark statute in 1870 and prohibited counterfeiting
six years later.8 Originally trademark law was not intended to protect consumers. 9 Instead, it
was designed to protect producers from illegimate deviations of their trade by competitors.10 But
the emphasis has shifted from viewing a trademark as a source of information about the product,
to viewing the trademark as the product. 11 Trademarks hold immense value for trademark
owners, who range from individuals to Fortune 500 companies. Trademarks are now seen as a
commodity in a fast-paced globalized world.
Fast-forward seventy-six years, and Congress enacted the Lanham Act as the allencompassing trademark statute. The chief concern of Congress was to ensure that registered
marks receive uniform, national protection. 12 Registration occurs when an applicant files an
application with the Patent and Trademark Office. 13 The application must include a statement

7

See Generally Derek A. Hawkins, Likelihood of Destruction- Restructuring the Trademark Dilution by Blurring
Factors in the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, 18 M ARQ. I NTELL. PROP. L. REV. 409, 413-29 (2014)
(“Dilution by blurring is the association arising from similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark
that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark.”).
8 1 Gilson on Trademarks § 1.06 (2020).
9 Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 Notre Dame L. R EV. 1839, 1840 (2007).
10 Id.
11 Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 Emory L.J. 367, 372 (1999).
12 Clairol Inc. v. Gillette Co., 389 F.2d 264, 267 (2d. Cir. 1968).
13 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(1).
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that to the “best of the verifier’s knowledge and belief, no other person has the right to use such
mark in commerce either in the identical form…or such resemblance…as to be likely…to cause
confusion.14 If and when approved, a registered trademark serves public notice that it must not
be used without permission, but it gives the creator no new rights in its adoption. 15 Trademarks
may be classified as running from strong to weak and receive varying degrees of protection
accordingly.16 A strong trademark will be afforded higher protections with a broader range of
product lines, while a weaker trademark will be awarded a narrow scope of protection in the
specified line of goods or services noted in the application.
Overall, trademarks seek to signify a source, distinguish that source from competitors,
and prevent confusion in the marketplace.17 Though registration of a trademark does not afford
the creator any new benefits, it puts the marketplace on notice and provides legal remedies if the
trademark is improperly used.18 Two landmark Supreme Court Cases in the past several years
have changed the way trademarks are viewed and have raised questions about other provisions of
the Lanham Act. 19
TAM and BRUNETTI DECISIONS
In Tam, Simon Tam, the lead singer of the rock group “The Slants,” sought federal
registration of the mark “THE SLANTS.”20 Federal registration “serves as constructive notice of
the registrant’s claim of ownership of the mark...and can make a mark incontestable once it has

14

U.S.C. § 1051(a)(3)(D).
Cal. Prune & Apricot Growers’ Ass’n v. H.R. Nicholson Co., 69 Cal. App. 2d 207, 222-23 (1945).
16 See Proxite Prods. v. Bonnie Brite Prods. Corp., 206 F. Supp. 511, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
17 Laura D. Steele, Actual or Hypothetical: Determining the Proper Test for Trademark Licensee Rights in
Bankruptcy, 14 M ARQ. I NTELL . PROP. L. REV. 411, 416 (2010).
18 See Generally U.S.C. § 1125(a).
19 See Generally Sara Gold, Does Dilution “Dilute” the First Amendment?: Trademark Dilution and the Right to
Free Speech After Tam and Brunetti, 59 IDEA 483, 502 (2019).
20 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1747 (2017).
15
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been registered for five years.”21 The Patent Trademark Office (PTO) rejected the mark because
of the disparagement clause in the Lanham Act. 22 This provision prohibits the registration of a
trademark “which may disparage…persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national
symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.”23 An examiner at the Patent Trademark
Office (PTO) applied a two-part test to determine whether the mark violated the disparagement
clause.24 The examiner first considered the likely meaning of the matter in question, and if that
meaning is found to refer to identifiable persons, institutions, beliefs or national symbols, the
examiner moved onto the second step.25 Next, the examiner questioned whether that meaning
may be disparaging to a substantial composite of the referenced group.26 The question was
whether this particular portion of the Lanham Act violates the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment.27
The Government first defended the use of the disparagement provision by arguing federal
trademarks are government speech.28 Its main reason was that the PTO is “an arm” of the federal
government.29 The Court pushed back and stated “the Federal Government does not dream up
these marks, and it does not edit marks submitted for registration.” 30 The PTO has made it clear
that registration does not constitute approval of a mark. 31 As has been noted by previous cases,
the Free Speech Clause does not regulate government speech.32 When a government entity

21

Id. at 1753.
Id. at 1751.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1754 (2017).
27 See Generally U.S. C ONST . amend. I (stating “Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of speech”).
28 See Matal v. Tam, 37 S. Ct. 1744, 1757 (2017).
29 Id. at 1758.
30
Id.
31 Id.
32 See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009); Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Assn., 544 U.S.
550, 553 (2005).
22
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embarks on a course of action, it takes a particular viewpoint and rejects others. 33 The Free
Speech Clause “does not require government to maintain viewpoint neutrality when its officers
and employees speak about that venture.”34 With this great “immunity” from the Free Speech
Clause, the government speech doctrine is susceptible to dangerous misuse. 35 Justice Alito noted
that, “if private speech could be passed off as government speech by simply affixing a
government seal of approval, government could silence or muffle the expression of disfavored
viewpoints.”36
The Government next argued that federal registration of trademarks constituted
government-subsidized speech.37 Case precedent has held that “the Government may not deny a
benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected...freedom of speech
even if he has no entitlement to that benefit. 38 The Court responded by distinguishing that case
precedent as cases that all involved cash subsidies or their equivalent. 39 The PTO does not pay
money to parties seeking registration of a mark.40 For that reason, federal registration of
trademark does not constitute government-subsidized speech.
Finally, the government finally argued that the disparagement clause was designed to
prevent underrepresented groups from being bombarded with demeaning messages in
commercial advertising.41 Therefore, it serves a substantial interest and is narrowly drawn. To

33

Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1757 (2017).
Id.
35 Id. at 1758
36 Id.
37
Id. at 1760.
38 Id. at 1760-61.
39 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1761 (2017).
40 Id.
41 Id. at 1764
34
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this, the Court notes that, “the clause reaches any trademark that disparages any person, group, or
institution. It is not an anti-discrimination clause; it is a happy-talk clause.”42
Justice Kennedy did note that “this case does not present the question of how other
provisions of the Lanham Act should be analyzed under the First Amendment.” 43 He found
solace on relying in the substantial safeguards of free and open discussion in a democratic
society.44 All the Justices did agree that if a trademark registration bar is viewpoint-based, it is
unconstitutional.45 Viewpoint discrimination occurs when the government chooses among
similarly situated speakers to advance or suppress a specific point of view. 46 With this portion of
the Lanham Act struck down because of its broadness and its failure to qualify as government
speech or government-subsidized speech, the disparagement provision can no longer be used in
the PTO’s registration process.
Two years after Tam the stage was set for the Supreme Court to analyze a different
section of the statute. Iancu v. Brunetti was another landmark case for trademarks that struck
another provision of the Lanham Act. Erik Brunetti is an artist and entrepreneur who founded a
clothing line that uses the trademark FUCT. 47 The Court analyzed the Lanham Act’s registration
prohibition on marks that consist of or comprise immoral or scandalous matter. 48 The PTO
applied the bar as a unitary provision rather than treating the two adjectives in it separately. 49
The PTO board concluded that the term is extremely offensive and therefore barred

42

Id. at 1765.
Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1768 (2017) (J. Kennedy. Concur).
44 Id. at 1769.
45 Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2299 (2019).
46 Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination Revisited, 98 VA. L. R EV. 231, 235 (2012).
47 Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297 (2019).
48 Id.
49 Id.
43

7

registration.50 All the Justices in Tam agreed that if a trademark registration bar is viewpointbased, it is unconstitutional.51
The Court again found this portion viewpoint-based, concluding that it distinguishes
between two opposed sets of ideas: “those aligned with conventional moral standards and those
hostile to them.”52 The PTO rejected marks conveying approval of drug use because it is
scandalous to “inappropriately glamorize drug abuse.”53 Also, the PTO rejected marks reflecting
support for al-Qaeda, but approved registration of a mark approving the war against terrorism.54
In response, the government argued the idea is to “narrow the statutory bar to marks that are
offensive or shocking to a substantial segment of the public because of their mode of expression,
independent of any views that they may express.”55 The immoral or scandalous bar that the PTO
sets stretches far beyond the government’s proposed construction.56 Again, the statute is too
broad for the Court, which unsubtly urged Congress that a “more carefully focused statute”
would be appropriate.57
Justice Breyer, in his partial concurrence and dissent, preferred a proportionality analysis
to determine whether trademark provisions offend the First Amendment. 58 In Justice Breyer’s
opinion, the question should be: “Does the regulation at issue work harm to First Amendment
interests that is disproportionate in light of the relevant regulatory objectives?”59 He recognized
trademark law’s “specialized mission” and that mission, by its very nature, requires the

50

Id. at 2298.
Id. at 2299.
52 Id. at 2300.
53 Iancu, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2300 (2019).
54 Id.
55 Id. at 2301.
56 Id. at 2301.
57 Id. at 2303.
58 Iancu, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2306 (2019).
59 Id.
51
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government to impose limitations on speech.60 Attention-grabbing words threaten to distract
consumers and disrupt commerce.61 Justice Breyer provides valuable insight and another
perspective on the balance of trademark law and the First Amendment.
Both Tam and Brunetti found portions of the Lanham Act viewpoint-based and thus
found the respective federal trademark registration bars unconstitutional. Another provision of
the Lanham Act, dilution by tarnishment, is seen by some as viewpoint-based and requires
further analysis of why that could be.
DILUTION LAW
“Dilution is a use of the same or similar mark, trade name, label, or advertisement that
diminishes the distinctive quality of the plaintiff’s mark, trade name, label, or form of
advertisement or injures plaintiff’s business reputation.” 62 The enactment of federal dilution law
was “a landmark upgrade of a legal concept…that was largely ineffectual.”63 Beginning with
Massachusetts in 1947, a number of states enacted statutes that offered protection against a
dilution of the distinctive quality of a trademark. 64 Some courts, and numerous commentators,
expressed fear that the uncertain limits of the anti-dilution cause of action would unduly expand
the ability of trademark owners to monopolize language and inhibit free competition.65 There
are two forms of dilution, blurring and tarnishment and both undermine the selling power of a
mark; the latter displacing positive with negative associations. 66

Id. (noting that the mission of trademark law is to “help consumers identify goods and services that they wish to
purchase, as well as those they want to avoid.”).
61 Id. at 2307.
62 1 Ln Practice Guide: FL Business Torts §9.09 (2021).
63 Id.
64 Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 25 cmt. b (Am. Law. Inst. 1995).
65 Id.
66 Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 25 cmt. c (Am. Law. Inst. 1995).
60
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This note focuses on dilution by tarnishment, which is defined as “association arising
from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation
of the famous mark.67 Courts typically follow a four-part test to determine if there is dilution. A
plaintiff must show that (1) the mark is famous and distinctive; (2) the defendant is making use
of the mark in commerce; (3) the defendant’s use began after the mark became famous; and (4)
the defendant’s use of the mark is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by
tarnishment.68 There are four statutory factors for determining whether a mark is sufficiently
famous:69
(i) The duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising and publicity of the mark,
whether advertised or publicized by the owner or third parties.
(ii) The amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods or services offered under
the mark.
(iii) The extent of actual recognition of the mark.
(iv) Whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of
February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
To support a dilution by tarnishment claim, the use of marks must cause an association of
different products that would embarrass the senior mark holder. 70 The justification for adopting
this standard would be that it “creates consumer aversion to the famous brand…because the
public will associate the lack of quality or lack of prestige in the defendant’s goods with the
plaintiff’s unrelated goods.71 The purpose of the statute is not to protect all trademarks and their
owners, but only those with the most powerful trademarks in commerce. The Ninth Circuit,
which hears most trademark claims (because of the big entertainment industry in California) has

67

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B), (C) (2020).
Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 518 F.3d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 2008).
69 GILSON, supra note 1.
70 See Sensient Techs. Corp. v. SensoryEffects Flavor Co., 613 F.3d 754, 771; Window World Int’l v. O’Toole No.
4:19-cv-2363, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 223071, at *14 (E.D. Mo.R. Nov. 30, 2020).
71 Rosetta Stone Ltd. V. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 167 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing Scott Fetzer Co. v. House of
Vacuums Inc., 381 F.3d 477, 589 (5th Cir. 2004)).
68
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concluded that dilution protection extends only to marks that are household names.72 Courts
have described dilution fame as a difficult and demanding requirement.73 Time after time,
whether it be the craft beer industry or coffee roasting, plaintiffs have failed to show a violation
of dilution by tarnishment.74
The statute protects only the top of the commercial food chain and does not restrict all
damaging speech from occurring. This protection of famous marks also occurs because of the
potential of free riding. Free riding occurs when the owner of a lesser-known mark creates an
association with a more famous mark to improve the lesser-known mark’s reputation or reach by
exploiting the famous mark’s success.75 This problem occurs with both dilution by tarnishment
and dilution by blurring.
This can be seen in the dilution by tarnishment case of Bentley Motors Corp.76 Bentley,
a high-end automobile manufacturer, sued the defendant for unlawfully manufacturing Bentley
body kits that transformed ordinary and inexpensive Chrysler and Ford Vehicles into knockoff
Bentley vehicles.77 The Court concluded that Congress intended to protect from dilution marks
so inherently distinctive and famous as to rise to the level of “Buick” or “DuPont.” 78 The Court
also concluded that all the other elements of trademark dilution were satisfied. “When identical
marks are used on similar goods, dilution- the capacity of the famous mark to identify and
distinguish the goods of the trademark holder- obviously occurs.”79

72

Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1011 (9th Cir. 2004).
Stone Brewing Co., LLC v. MillerCoors LLC, 445 F.Supp. 3d 1113, 1145-46.
74 See id. at 1147; Planet Coffee Roasters, Inc. v. Dam, No. SACV09-00571-MLG, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70775,
at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2009).
75 Ryder Hogan, Examining the Unconstitutionality of Dilution By Tarnishment After Tam, 27 AM. U.J. Gender SOC.
POL’Y & L. 465, 471 (2019).
76 See Generally Bentley Motors Corp. v. McEntegart, 976 F. Supp. 2d 1297, 1312-14 (M.D. Fla. 2013).
77 Id. at 1303.
78 Id. at 1313 (quoting Provide Commerce, Inc. v. Preferred Commerce, Inc., No. 07-80185CIV, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 27697, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 4, 2008).
79 Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., v. Pro-Line Protoform, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1085 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
73
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Famous trademarks do not always cover products; they also can cover entities, such as
professional sports teams. The Dallas Cowboys have used “America’s Team” since 1979. 80 In
Dallas Cowboys Football Club, the defendant was a sports shop in Minnesota who used the
“America’s Team” phrase on various t-shirts and other sports apparel.81 Even without federal
registration of the mark, the inferior quality of the defendant’s products and website tarnished
plaintiff’s trademark and met the federal threshold.82 But just because a trademark is famous
does not mean that a dilution by tarnishment claim will succeed. In another case, Starbucks sued
Wolfe’s Borough Coffee because it was selling a blend of roasted coffee under the name
“Charbucks Blend.”83 The Court noted that the Starbucks mark is famous within the meaning of
the FTDA.84 A survey done on behalf of Starbucks offered no evidence that Wolfe’s Borough
Coffee incorporated negative perceptions to Starbucks products.85 No dilution by tarnishment
was found even though Starbucks was considered a famous mark. The mental association
between a famous mark and a lesser known mark is at the heart of any dilution by tarnishment
claim.86 The next section will take a look at the meaning of viewpoint discrimination and some
judicial examples.
VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION
The First Amendment means that Government has no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.87 Content discrimination

Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd. v. Am’s Team Props., 616 F. Supp. 2d 622, 631 (N.D. Tex. 2009).
Id. at 630.
82 Id. at 643 (noting that in 2006 the defendant distributed thousands of “America’s Team” wristbands with the word
“basketball” misspelled).
83 Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., No. 01CIV5981, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS33578, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 23, 2005).
84 Id.
85 Id. at *28.
86 Hogan, supra note 51, at 475.
87 Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
80
81
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includes the sub-categories of subject matter and viewpoint discrimination. Subject matter
discrimination occurs when a state regulates speech based on its topic or subject matter
irrespective of the viewpoint expressed by the speaker.88 Laws that only target sexual speech or
only allow picketing on the subject of labor are examples of subject matter discrimination.89
These laws are subject to strict scrutiny, which means they must: (1) advance a compelling
governmental interest; (2) be directly and substantially related to advancing those ends; and (3)
be the least restrictive and effective means to advance the ends. 90 The basic idea behind the
content-discrimination principle is that it is usually wrong for the government to regulate speech
because of what the speech is saying.91
Viewpoint discrimination is a sub-category of content discrimination. Courts have held
that viewpoint discrimination occurs when the government chooses among similarly situated
speakers to advance or suppress a specific point of view. 92 There is a great deal of agreement
that viewpoint discrimination is at the core of what the First Amendment forbids. 93 The Supreme
Court has noted that viewpoint discrimination is “an egregious form of content discrimination.” 94
While content discrimination is allowed in some fora, the Court has made clear that viewpoint
discrimination is not allowed in any fora.95 According to Justice Kennedy, the test for viewpoint
discrimination turns on whether “the government has singled out a subset of messages for

88

People v. Aleem, 149 P.3d 765, 778 (Colo. 2007).
See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811-12 (2000); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,
461-62 (1980).
90 R. Randall Kelso, Clarifying Viewpoint Discrimination in Free Speech Doctrine, 52 I ND. L. R EV. 355, 368 (2019).
91 Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination Revisited, 98 VA. L. R EV. 231, 235 (2012).
92 Id.
93 Kendrick, supra, at 56.
94 Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
95 See, e.g., Minn. Voters Alliance v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1885 (2018) (viewpoint discrimination prohibited in
non-public forums); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469-70 (2009) (viewpoint discrimination
prohibited in traditional, designated, and limited public forums).
89
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disfavor based on the views expressed.”96 The broad nature of the statute in Tam made the
registration process highly subjective and put the government in a position to pick and choose
which trademarks it favored.97
There have been several examples of alleged viewpoint discrimination in recent years
that have made their way up to the United States Court of Appeals and subsequently found as not
viewpoint discrimination. In First Resort, a San Francisco ordinance was passed to protect
indigent woman facing unexpected pregnancies from the harms posed by false or misleading
advertising by limited services pregnancy centers (“LSPC”).98 The “Findings” section of the
ordinance explained that “in recent years, out of the clinics that seek to counsel clients against
abortion some of those seek to mislead women contemplating abortion into believing that their
facilities offer abortion services and unbiased counseling.” 99 The justification that San Francisco
noted is “when a woman is misled into believing that a clinic offers services that it does not in
fact offer, she loses time crucial to the decision whether to terminate a pregnancy.”100 The Ninth
Circuit claims that there is no viewpoint discrimination present because the Ordinance regulates
LSPCs because they engage in false or misleading speech, irrespective of their viewpoints. 101
The Ordinance in no way restricts those entities from expressing their views about abortion to
the public or their clients.102 No viewpoint discrimination was found in this case because the
underlying legislative motive was to prevent false advertising and misinformation from being
spread.

96

Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1766 (2017) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See Ned Snow, Immoral Trademarks After Brunetti, 58 H OUS. L. REV. 401, 434 (2020).
98 First Resort, Inc. v. Herrera, 850 F.3d 1263, 1266 (9th Cir. 2017).
99 Id. at 1269.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 1277-78.
102 Id. at 1278.
97

14

Similar to dilution by tarnishment, there is an overarching legislative motive that does not
include discriminating on the basis of viewpoint. For dilution by tarnishment, the goal is the
same as trademark law in general; protect consumers and trademark holders alike. 103
An example of where provisions were too broad to qualify as viewpoint discrimination
can be seen in Gerlich.104 Iowa State University (ISU) has a policy that student groups may use
ISU’s trademarks on merchandise if ISU’s Trademark Licensing Office determines that the use
complies with ISU’s Guidelines for University Trademark Use by Student and Campus
Organizations.105 NORML ISU is a recognized student organization at ISU whose purpose is to
reform federal and state marijuana laws. 106 It requested permission from ISU’s Trademark
Office to use their t-shirt design, which included a cannabis leaf on it. 107 After rejection of the
use, the guidelines were revised to prohibit “designs that suggest promotion of the below listed
items…dangerous, illegal, or unhealthy products, actions or behaviors…or drugs and drug
paraphernalia that are illegal or unhealthful.”108 After an article was published in the Des Moines
Register, NORML ISU was required to obtain approval from upper management. This method
of approval was unheard of at the University. 109 The unusual trademark approval process with
respect to all of the trademark design applications showed evidence that the university was
motivated by viewpoint discrimination.110 The unusual procedure and revised policies for
approval served as key indicators for the Court that the process was motivated by viewpoint

103

1 Gilson on Trademarks § 1.06 (2020).
See Generally Gerlich v. Leath, 861 F.3d 697, 697-720 (8th Cir. 2017).
105 Id. at 701.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 702.
108 Id. at 703.
109 Gerlich v. Leath, 861 F.3d 697, 705 (8th Cir. 2017).
110 Id. at 707.
104
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discrimination. This is yet another provision that was found to be too broad, which implicated
discrimination on the basis of viewpoint.
Both of these cases provide examples of when viewpoint discrimination is and is not
found. If there is a clear underlying legislative motive that is subsequently met, then a court is
more inclined to find against viewpoint discrimination. But, if a provision is too broad and
leaves too much room for interpretation, then a court has no problem determining that there is
viewpoint discrimination.
PART III
DILUTION BY TARNISHMENT VIEWED UNDER STRICT SCRUTINY
As noted above, dilution by tarnishment is the association arising from the similarity
between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation of the famous
mark.111 To consider whether a mark is deemed “famous” the PTO considers: (1) the duration,
extent, and geographic reach of advertising and the publicity of the mark; (2) the amount,
volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods or services offered under the mark; and (3) the
extent of actual recognition of the mark.112 The judicial standard of strict scrutiny is the
regulation or law must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. 113 In Tam and
Brunetti, the standard of strict scrutiny was applied because both sections of the Lanham Act
constituted viewpoint discrimination.114 The Court in Brunetti noted that in Tam a majority of
justices did not agree that any viewpoint-based restrictions on trademarks would be subject to
strict scrutiny.115 This section will look at two different arguments that could be made to look at

111

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(C) (2020).
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(a) (i-iii) (2020).
113 Dotson v. Kander, 464 S.W.3d 190, 197 (Mo. 2015).
114 See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2303 (2019); Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1754 (2017).
115 Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2298-99.
112

16

dilution by tarnishment as viewpoint discrimination. At the end of each argument, will also be a
rebuttal as to why dilution by tarnishment should not be viewed in that light.
The first argument is the focus on the “tarnish” aspect of the dilution by tarnishment
provision. Some may argue that the tarnishment aspect, taken in the literal sense constitutes
viewpoint discrimination.116 The worry is that determining whether a similar trademark
tarnishes another trademark effectively creates a favored viewpoint.117 Or in other words, it
regulates based on a negative perceived opinion of the trademark. 118 In Tam, the Court struck
down the disparagement clause of the Lanham Act.119 The disparagement clause prohibited the
registration of a trademark “which may disparage…persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs,
or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.” 120 The Court found that further
analysis into the type of speech was not necessary because the clause constituted viewpoint
discrimination.121 Similarly in Brunetti, the Court had a difficult time narrowly construing the
broad language of the “immoral or scandalous” clause.122 A narrowing construction is not
plausible and it “cannot stand in the shoes of the legislature and rewrite a statute.”123
Dilution by tarnishment is not viewpoint discrimination because “tarnishment” is not as
broad as previously struck down clauses and does not turn on viewpoint.

116

See generally Ryder Hogan, Examining the Unconstitutionality of Dilution By Tarnishment After Tam, 27 AM.
U.J. Gender SOC. POL’Y & L. 465 (2019); Lisa Ramsey, Symposium: Increasing First Amendment Scrutiny of
Trademark Law After Matal v. Tam, SCOTUSblog (June 20, 2017, 2:33 PM)
https://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/symposium -increasing-first-amendment-scrutiny-trademark-law-matal-v-tam/.
117 See generally Ryder Hogan, Examining the Unconstitutionality of Dilution By Tarnishment After Tam, 27 AM.
U.J. Gender SOC. POL’Y & L. 465,471 (2019).
118 Id.
119 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017).
120 Id.
121 Id. at 1765.
122 Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2300 (2019).
123 In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1356 (Fed Cir. 2017).

17

Dilution by tarnishment only occurs against famous trademarks.124 To even determine if
a trademark is famous, there are several statutory factors a court must weigh. 125 These statutory
factors narrow the scope of the provision. What Justice Alito and Justice Kennedy worried about
with the broadness of the disparagement clause is not present here. The dilution by tarnishment
provision has a narrow scope, and there is a multi-layered analysis to determine if there is a
cause of action. The verb “tarnishment” only attaches to famous trademarks. Unlike “immoral”
or “scandalous” there is not a wide range of trademarks that can be affected. In Brunetti, the
Government urged the Court to interpret the “immoral or scandalous” provision to be limited to
“refusing marks that are vulgar.”126 The Court left the door open that the Government proposed
bar could be constitutional under the First Amendment.127 Justice Kagan even ends the plurality
opinion by stating that “there are a great many immoral and scandalous ideas in the world and
the Lanham Act covers them all. It therefore violates the First Amendment.” 128 A second
ground-breaking opinion for trademark law ends with a hint that the “immoral or scandalous” bar
covered just too much for the Court’s liking.
The second reason why dilution by tarnishment does not constitute viewpoint
discrimination is because the broader purpose of the provision does not turn on any particular
viewpoint. Dilution by tarnishment falls under the purview of the Lanham, which is federal
trademark statute. The Senate recognized two goals of the Lanham Act: the protection of
consumers and the protection of the individual trademark holder.129 The Senate also
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contemplated that the Act should protect the goodwill and reputation of a trademark owner that
spends significant resources in creating public confidence in the trademark owner’s brand. 130
The Act defined dilution as “the legal theory that seeks to protect a trademark owner
directly against the diminution of a trademark’s commercial...selling power by the unauthorized
junior of the same or substantially similar mark.”131 The dilution by tarnishment provision
serves that exact purpose. Tarnishment occurs when the “goodwill and reputation of a plaintiff’s
trade dress are linked to products which will conjure associations that clash with the associations
generated by the owner’s lawful use of a mark.” 132 Goodwill and reputation is the foundation of
the associations generated by a famous mark. 133 Tarnishment of a famous trademark does not
turn on what the offender has to say. It aims to protect trademark owners who have spent
significant time and money on building the goodwill of their brand. If the dilution by
tarnishment provision is struck down, then the entire Lanham Act may fail First Amendment
scrutiny.
Tarnishment causes a likelihood of confusion and/or a negative association of the famous
trade mark.134 This confusion arises from consumers, not the Government. 135 Because
consumers link the famous mark to other products, the subsequent mark weakens, or dilutes, the
famous mark’s unique and distinctive link to a particular product. 136 This is an important
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distinction from the provisions struck down in Tam and Brunetti.137 The Court in both cases had
trouble reconciling with the fact that the Government had broad discretion in determining which
trademarks were offensive.138 Case precedent has further shown the main purpose of the dilution
by tarnishment provision is to protect trademark owners rather than discriminate based on
viewpoint.
An example of where a likelihood of confusion between trademarks equates to dilution
by tarnishment can be found in Bayer.139 The plaintiff, Bayer Corporation, had sold tens of
millions of dollars worth of animal flea control preparations under their ADVANTAGE
trademark throughout the United States. 140 The ADVANTAGE mark has become famous, and
“represents an extraordinarily valuable goodwill owned by Bayer Corporation. 141 This is the
exact type of trademark that qualifies for protection by the dilution by tarnishment provision.
The defendant, Custom School Frames (CSF), created and used a website named
www.nofleas.com to advertise and sell foreign products of Bayer without Bayer’s permission. 142
CSF also uses the ADVANTAGE mark on its website without Bayer’s consent. 143
There are material differences between the foreign products that CSF is selling and what
Bayer sells.144 The Court noted that trademark dilution, “by its very nature results in irreparable
injury since the attendant loss of goodwill, reputation and business cannot adequately be
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quantified and the trademark owner cannot adequately be compensated.” 145 Clearly, the court
was more concerned with the injury to the trademark owner than what the infringer’s point was.
A famous mark’s goodwill was tarnished by another trademark that has several material
differences.
The exceptions to dilution by tarnishment also provide another example of the core
function of this section of the Lanham Act. These exceptions are fair use, all forms of news
reporting and news commentary, and any noncommercial use of a mark. 146 The fair use
exception applies to parodies and/or criticisms.147 Similar statutory exceptions can be found in
regards to copyrights and their respective fair use exception. 148 This provides another example
that the dilution by tarnishment poses a high bar for plaintiffs and is not as broad as the other
struck down provisions of the Lanham Act.
The World Wrestling case shows how the dilution by tarnishment exception are applied
in practice.149 The Worldwide Wrestling Federation Entertainment, Inc. (WWE) “is an integrated
media and entertainment company engaged in the development, promotion, and marketing of
television programming, pay-per-view programing and live area events.”150 The defendant, Big
Dog, “develops, markets, and retails a branded lifestyle collection of unique, high quality,
popular priced consumer products.”151 Big Dog alleges that its t-shirts appeal to customers who
enjoy mocking pop phenomena.152 Some of WWE’s most popular wrestling characters have
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trademarks registered for themselves.153 Big Dog has made several t-shirt designs that depicted
these wrestling characters and the Court was tasked with deciding whether these t-shirts were a
parody and therefore could not cause any confusion. 154
The Court did not deny that here are similarities between the two marks, but the “mere
fact that consumers mentally associate the junior user’s mark with a famous mark is not
sufficient to establish actionable dilution.155 A junior use of a mark that serves a parodic purpose
will not be unlawful under the dilution by tarnishment provision.
This is yet another example limiting the section’s prospective reach. It is a section of the
Lanham Act that truly embodies trademark law and the protections it seeks to afford. Dilution by
tarnishment is not concerned with offensive expression as much as it is with consumer
confusion. Without dilution by tarnishment, there is no protection for trademark owners who
have spent an immense amount of time and money on perfecting their reputation. Viewpoint
discrimination is per se unlawful because it clashes with the First Amendment principles of free
speech. The dilution by tarnishment provision embodies the ultimate goal of trademark law:
protection for consumers and trademark owners alike. This principle been manifested through its
statutory factors and its application by various courts.
IMPLICATIONS
The question presented in this note is the viability of the dilution by tarnishment statute
after the decisions in Tam and Brunetti. Commentators are worried about the viability of the
dilution section, but upholding its constitutionality can possibly provide some clarity in the world
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of trademarks.156 If the provision is upheld, trademark owners of famous trademarks will still be
able to receive federal protection for their registered trademarks. Federal protection would
eliminate most worries for defendants of plaintiffs raising First Amendment issues in dilution
cases. Even if claims are still being raised the statutory exceptions to dilution by tarnishment
might be used more frequently. Those defenses are fair use, all forms of news reporting and
news commentary, and any noncommercial use of a mark.157
On the other hand, there are huge ramifications if dilution by tarnishment is struck down
and deemed unconstitutional. If that occurs, lawmakers might have to go back to the drawing
board to rewrite the provision. The broadness of dilution by tarnishment might hurt the section’s
constitutionality.158 The Tam opinion invites trademark litigants to raise constitutional claims
and courts to experiment with free-speech doctrines in trademark law.159 For example,
companies accused of trademark dilution may be able to argue that the dilution statute is an
unconstitutional content-based regulation of non-misleading expression and is facially invalid
under the First Amendment.160 Trademarks do not need to be federally registered and can still
exist in the commercial world without federal registration. Famous marks would take a potential
hit because dilution by tarnishment serves to protect only the most recognizable trademarks in
commerce.
PART IV
CONCLUSION
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It is also important to note a possible solution if dilution by tarnishment does not become
classified as commercial speech or is classified as viewpoint discrimination. As previously
mentioned the ramifications of completely striking down dilution would be massive, so instead a
different solution should be considered. One possible solution is to narrow the scope of the
section even further. The Court in both Tam and Brunetti expressed serious concerns with the
breadth of the provisions at issue in those cases. 161 If a broad statute seems to be the problem,
then narrowing the dilution by tarnishment provision could be a possible solution. Scholars have
suggested that the phrase “harming the reputation of” has no measurable context. 162 If Congress
matches the statutory factors it puts forth to define a “famous mark” with statutory factors to
defining “harming the reputation”, then defendants may have a tougher time arguing that dilution
by tarnishment is too broad. A narrower statute may also lead to less claims. It will be more
difficult to meet the statutory threshold and will hopefully deter frivolous claims. This note
argues for the constitutionality of dilution by tarnishment, but if found unconstitutional,
narrowing the scope of the section may suffice in the eyes of the Court.
This note sought to analyze if the dilution by tarnishment section of the Lanham Act
would be upheld after the recent decisions in Brunetti and Tam for two reasons.
First, the term “tarnish” in the aforementioned provision does not turn on viewpoint like
its other Lanham Act counterparts. There is an extensive process to determine which trademarks
even qualify for the trademark provision and tarnishing does not pick out viewpoints, but rather
goes through a thorough factual analysis. Unlike the “disparagement” or the “immoral or
See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2302 (2019) (noting “the immoral or scandalous bar is substantially
overbroad”); Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764-65 (2017) (noting that “the disparagement clause is not narrowly
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162 See Christopher R. Kinkade, Is Trademark Dilution Law Diluting Rights? A Survey of the Trademark Dilution
Revision Act of 2006, 31 Seton Hall Legis. J. 433, 455 (2007) (noting that “The ALCU asserts that all successful
criticism may be classified as dilution by tarnishment; after all, one purpose of criticism is to harm the target of the
criticism).
161

24

scandalous” provisions, there is not an infinite number of trademarks that could be affected. The
PTO is not picking and choosing which trademarks fit these broad terms. Instead, the dilution by
tarnishment provision stands as a remedy for famous trademarks, which leads to the second
reason.
The provision fits right into the goals of trademark law. Trademark law seeks to protect
owners and consumers alike. Case precedent has proven that the dilution by tarnishment
provision fits right into that principle. Courts have repeatedly emphasized the importance of the
protection of famous trademarks and all the time and money that has been spent in creating their
goodwill and reputation.163 These two reasons provide an explanation why the dilution by
tarnishment provision is not viewpoint discrimination and therefore should not be struck down
by the Supreme Court.
The ramifications of a decision either way would be huge for trademark owners. If struck
down, that leaves a slippery slope for the rest of Lanham Act and questions of what Congress can
do will begin to be suggested. If upheld, as this note concludes, then that would be a huge
landmark achievement for the world of trademark law and consumers and famous mark owners
can rejoice. With a growing globalized United States, trademarks are pivotal in protecting
business persons from suffering injury. Famous trademarks have dedicated an expansive amount
of time and money to ensure their goodwill and pristine reputation. Consumers expect a certain
service and/or product when they deal with a certain trademark. This note has displayed various
cases of famous trademarks and the positive mental associations consumers make with them.
The federal protections that are conferred upon owners in invaluable. If the Court strikes down
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another portion of the Lanham Act, then claimants and users of trademarks would not know
whether their works were still protection, or whether protection had evaporated. 164
Anyone can file for federal trademark protections and that is symbolic of true American
entrepreneurship. Dilution by tarnishment does not constitute viewpoint discrimination because
Congress has laid out very specific statutory factors to even meet the threshold of a famous
mark.165 These specific statutory factors serve as the guideline for trademark owners and
potential trademark infringers. The problem with Tam and Brunetti was the broadness of the
statute and the Court felt that the Government was controlling speech. 166
This question of constitutionality could be on the Supreme Court’s docket in a year or
two. This note provides a preview of what could be to come and the ramifications of such a
decision. Other portions of the Lanham Act are inevitably going to be closely looked at for their
constitutionality. It would be fair to ask whether Congress should scrap the current statute and
rewrite it with the words of the Court in mind. The opinions in Brunetti and Tam gave a lot of
“suggestions” on how the respective sections could survive viewpoint analysis. 167 Narrower
provisions could have possibly saved them from being deemed viewpoint discrimination. 168
Rewriting a whole statute would be time extensive and with the current track record of Congress
being on the same page, it seems highly unlikely a rewritten Lanham Act is a viable solution.
This note traversed the history of trademark law, analyzed the decisions of Brunetti and
Tam, scrutinized the dilution by tarnishment statute under the same lenses of case precedent, and
tried to come up with a viable solution to keep the Lanham Act alive. Principles that worried
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Justices in Tam and Brunetti should not be of concern when dealing with the dilution by
tarnishment provision. The provision aligns parallel with the ultimate goals of trademark law.
Dilution by tarnishment should be able to survive the court’s rigorous standard on a legal basis
and it should survive on an ethical basis as well.
Famous trademarks are vital to companies and individuals around the world . They
provide an identification for consumers, no matter where the demographic, location, and
economic status of the consumer. That identification goes through a vigorous legal process to
receive dilution by tarnishment protection. The last thing that is needed for both trademark
owners and consumers is another portion of the Lanham Act being erased without any remedies
in place to pick up the fallen pieces. No timetable is available to determine when this provision
could reach the Supreme Court’s docket. But with a growing globalized World, and more and
more trademarks attempting to be federally registered, it is only a matter of time before the
Supreme Court revisits the Lanham Act. And although there is no perfect solution, this note
provides optimism that at least one portion can survive.
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